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The
Letort Papers
In the early 18th century, James Letort, an explorer
and fur trader, was instrumental in opening up the
Cumberland Valley to settlement. By 1752, there was
a garrison on Letort Creek at what is today Carlisle
Barracks, Pennsylvania. In those days, Carlisle Barracks
lay at the western edge of the American colonies. It was
a bastion for the protection of settlers and a departure
point for further exploration. Today, as was the case
over 2 centuries ago, Carlisle Barracks, as the home
of the U.S. Army War College, is a place of transition
and transformation.
In the same spirit of bold curiosity that compelled
the men and women who, like Letort, settled the
American west, the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and
U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Press presents The
Letort Papers. This series allows SSI and USAWC Press
to publish papers, retrospectives, speeches, or essays
of interest to the defense academic community which
may not correspond with our mainstream policyoriented publications.
If you think you may have a subject amenable to
publication in our Letort Paper series, or if you wish
to comment on a particular paper, please contact
Dr. Steven K. Metz, Director of Research, Strategic
Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press,
U.S. Army War College, 47 Ashburn Drive, Carlisle,
PA 17013-5010. His phone number is (717) 245-3822;
e-mail address is steven.k.metz.civ@mail.mil. We look
forward to hearing from you.
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FOREWORD
The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) has maintained
close and positive professional ties with our colleagues
at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) in
Washington, DC, since ACSS’s founding in 1999. The
Africa Center is the preeminent U.S. Department of
Defense (DoD) institution for strategic security studies, research, and outreach in Africa.
I am pleased that SSI and ACSS are once more able
to collaborate in the publication of this monograph.
Its author, David E. Brown, is currently the Senior
Diplomatic Advisor at ACSS. He brings unique perspectives to the important foreign policy issue of illicit drug trafficking in West Africa, having served as
Deputy Chief of Mission at the three U.S. Embassies
in the subregion during much of the last decade, in
Cotonou, Benin; Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso; and
Nouakchott, Mauritania.
Mr. Brown’s Letort Paper describes how West Africa is under attack from international criminal networks that are using the subregion as a key global
hub for the distribution, wholesale, and increasing
production of illicit drugs, most prominently cocaine,
but also heroin and amphetamines and their precursors. While West African states have made remarkable
progress in democratic and economic development
over the past decade, the insidious effects of narcotics trafficking have the potential to reverse many
of these gains. The proceeds of drug trafficking are
fueling a dramatic increase in narco-corruption in the
region, allowing drug traffickers to stage coups d’état,
hijack elections, and co-opt or buy political power.
The problem has worsened to the point that these networks represent an existential threat to the viability of
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already fragile states in West Africa as independent,
rule of law based entities. Besides a spike in drug-related crime, narcotics trafficking is also fraying West
Africa’s traditional social fabric and creating a public
health crisis, with hundreds of thousands of new drug
addicts. On net, drug trafficking and other illicit trade
represent the most serious challenge to democratic
governance and human security in the region since resource conflicts rocked several West African countries
in the early-1990s.
The most important of these international criminal
networks are from Latin America—primarily from
Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico—partnering with
West African criminals. These criminals, particularly
Nigerians and Ghanaians, have been involved in
the global drug trade for several decades, first with
cannabis and later with heroin. There is also increasingly strong evidence linking terrorist organizations
or state sponsors of terrorism to the West Africa drug
trade, including Colombia’s Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC), al-Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM), Hezbollah (allied with elements in
the Lebanese diaspora), Venezuela, and Iran. These
criminal and terrorist groups are also a threat to U.S.
national security, because the illicit profits earned by
Latin American drug cartels operating in West Africa
strengthen the same criminal elements that traffic
drugs to North America, and the same North African
and Middle Eastern terrorist groups and nations that
target the United States.
Mr. Brown concludes by noting that international
aid to West Africa’s “war on drugs” is only in an initial stage. He offers specific counternarcotics policy
recommendations for U.S. Government agencies,
the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) and its com-
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ponents, the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) and its member-states, and the
international community, including the United Nations (UN). However, Mr. Brown stresses that West
Africa’s progress in combating drugs will have to be
measured in decades or even generations, not years,
and also unfold in parallel with creating alternative
sustainable livelihoods and addressing the longerterm challenges of human insecurity, poverty, and
underdevelopment.
SSI is pleased to offer this monograph in fulfill
ment of its mission to assist U.S. Army and DoD se
nior leaders and strategic thinkers in understanding
the key issues of the day.
			

			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
West Africa is under attack from international
criminal networks that are using the subregion as a
key global hub for the distribution, wholesale, and increased production of illicit drugs. Most drug trade in
West Africa involves cocaine sold in Europe, although
heroin is also trafficked to the United States, and the
subregion is becoming an export base for amphetamines and their precursors, mainly for East Asian
markets and, increasingly, the United States. The most
important of these criminal networks are drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) from Latin America—primarily from Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico—partnering with West African criminals. These criminals,
particularly Nigerians and Ghanaians, have been involved in the global drug trade for several decades,
first with cannabis and later with heroin. The problem
has worsened to the point that these networks represent an existential threat to the viability of already
fragile states in West Africa as independent, rule of
law based entities. As part of this new Latin AmericaWest Africa criminal nexus, Guinea-Bissau is generally recognized as a narco-state where state-capture
by traffickers has already occurred.
There is also increasingly strong evidence linking
terrorist organizations or state sponsors of terrorism
to the West Africa drug trade, including Colombia’s
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC),
al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Hezbollah
(allied with elements in the Lebanese diaspora), Venezuela, and Iran. These criminal and terrorist groups
are also a threat to U.S. national security, because the
illicit profits earned by Latin American drug cartels
operating in West Africa strengthen the same crimi-
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nal elements that traffic drugs to North America, and
the same North African and Middle Eastern terrorist groups and nations that target the United States.
The link to AQIM takes on particular significance in
light of this terrorist organization’s recent takeover of
a vast sector of ungoverned space in northern Mali,
along with Touareg allies.
West Africa’s geographical location between Latin
America and Europe made it an ideal transit zone for
exploitation by powerful drug cartels and terrorist
organizations—much as the Caribbean and Central
America had long suffered for being placed between
South America’s cocaine producers and North America’s cocaine users. West Africa’s primary operational
allure to traffickers is not actually geography, however, but rather its low standards of governance, low
levels of law enforcement capacity, and high rates of
corruption. Latin American traffickers recently relocated a share of their wholesale distribution from
the Western Hemisphere to West Africa, with the
subregion moving from being merely a short-term
transit point to becoming a storage and staging area
for wholesale repackaging, re-routing and sometimes
(re-)sale of drugs.
While West African states have made remarkable
progress in democratic and economic development
over the past decade, the insidious effects of narcotics
trafficking have the potential to reverse many of these
gains. The proceeds of drug trafficking, by far the
most lucrative transnational criminal activity in illicit
economies, are fueling a dramatic increase in narcocorruption in the region, allowing drug traffickers to
stage coups d’état, hijack elections, and co-opt or buy
political power. West African countries could develop
along similar lines to Mexico, where drug gangs have
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a symbiotic relationship with the state and political
parties, and drug-related violence increases significantly. Besides a spike in drug-related crime, narcotics trafficking is also fraying West Africa’s traditional
social fabric and creating a public health crisis, with
hundreds of thousands of new drug addicts. While
the inflow of drug money may seem economically
beneficial to West Africa in the short term, investors
will be less inclined to do business in the long term
if the subregion is unstable. On net, drug trafficking
and other illicit trade represent the most serious challenge to human security in the region since resource
conflicts rocked several West African countries in the
early-1990s.
International aid to West Africa’s “war on drugs”
is only in an initial stage. Until recently, the United
States, preoccupied by September 11, 2001 (9/11), and
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, dedicated too few resources to monitoring, much less combating, transnational organized crime (TOC) in West Africa. Largescale cocaine seizures in West Africa started in 2004,
but the laying of the Latin America-West Africa illicit
drug pipeline started well before that. After the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
adopted a regional action plan on drugs and organized
crime in 2008, the United Nations (UN) responded
with a 2010-14 plan, and the United States with its
own modest initiative in 2011. West Africa’s progress
in combating drugs will have to be measured in decades or even generations, not years, and also unfold
in parallel with creating alternative sustainable livelihoods and addressing the longer-term challenges of
human insecurity, poverty, and underdevelopment.
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This paper concludes with specific counternarcotics policy recommendations for the U.S. Government, including:
1. Expanding the U.S. Government’s physical presence in the subregion, including reopening the U.S.
Embassy in Guinea-Bissau, and considering new DEA
offices, e.g., in Bissau or Conakry, Guinea.
2. Seeking adequate, multiyear funding: to include support for the U.S. Government’s new West
Africa Cooperative Security Initiative (WACSI); for
DoD to continue to support the Liberian Coast Guard
under Operation ONWARD LIBERTY; and to
expand counternarcotics/illicit trafficking training
efforts under AFRICOM’s West Africa Regional
Engagement Plan.
3. Fostering closer partnerships with third countries on West Africa. For example, the U.S. Government could increase cooperation with European
Union (EU) member-states, including expanding
intelligence-sharing with the EU’s Maritime Analysis Operations Center (MAOC) in Lisbon; with Japan
and Korea to jointly address the increasing problem
of methamphetamine production in West Africa that
is sent for sale to Asia and the United States; with
China to support the maritime capacity of West African navies to carry out coast guard functions; and
with Brazil, which is already cooperating with African
countries including Cape Verde.
4. Deepening cooperation with UN Agencies and
INTERPOL, such as expanding cooperation with the
UN’s International Maritime Organization (IMO), including its efforts to work with the Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa (MOWCA) and
ECOWAS transport ministries.
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5. Aiding West Africa to expand maritime domain awareness and cooperation by supporting
ECOWAS efforts to develop a regional maritime
strategy and operational capacity through ongoing
technical assistance.
6. Promoting international and regional agreements, and changes in domestic law. The international community could help West African nations
to strengthen: a) their legal frameworks and enforcement mechanisms against organized crime, money
laundering, and corruption; and, b) their law enforcement agencies’ operational capabilities, including air,
maritime, and land border controls.
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Over the last decade, West Africa has made encouraging progress. Violent conflicts that had blighted the
region for many years have been ended. There have
been real advances in development, health, and education. Economic growth is accelerating. Democratic
practice, although still not the norm everywhere in
the region, is taking root. However, we need to take
action now before the grip of the criminal networks
linked to the trafficking of illicit drugs tightens
into a stranglehold on West African political and
economic development.
Former United Nations
Secretary General Kofi Annan,
February 2012
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THE CHALLENGE OF DRUG TRAFFICKING
TO DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE
AND HUMAN SECURITY IN WEST AFRICA
INTRODUCTION: BROAD CONTEXT OF DRUG
TRAFFICKING IN WEST AFRICA
West Africa is under attack from international
criminal networks that are using the subregion as a
key global hub for the distribution, wholesale, and increasing production of illicit drugs.1 Most of the drug
trade in West Africa involves cocaine sold in Europe,
although heroin is also trafficked to the United States;
the subregion is becoming an export base for amphetamines and their precursors, mainly for East Asian
markets and increasingly to the United States.2 At
least nine top-tier Latin American drug cartels have
already established bases in at least 11 of 16 West
African nations.3 Their illicit profits threaten U.S. national security interests by strengthening criminal elements in Latin America that also traffic drugs to North
America. For example, the same Latin drug trafficking
organizations (DTOs) transporting cocaine via West
Africa to Europe are also responsible for cocaine shipments via Mexico to the United States. Responding to
this, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) has revised its counternarcotics strategy and is carrying out
investigative efforts against these DTOs on both sides
of the Atlantic Ocean.4
In recent years, West Africa has grown exponentially from a minor trafficking route for cocaine
exports to a major hub.5 It was not until 2004 that
large-scale cocaine trafficking through West Africa
was first detected. Prior to this, annual cocaine seizure levels in West Africa had rarely exceeded one
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metric ton per year. Already by 2008, cocaine transshipments rivaled stolen crude oil for the most valuable smuggled commodity in West Africa.6 Estimates
of 2010 annual cocaine transshipments through West
Africa ranged widely between 46 and 300 tons, yielding wholesale revenues of $3 billion to $14 billion. By
some measures, 50 percent of non-U.S.-bound cocaine
now goes through West Africa, i.e., about 13 percent
of global flows.7 African authorities actually detected
fewer drugs in 2010 than in the 2 prior years, but this
is likely because traffickers switched to new conveyances and routes.8 The hiding of drugs in containers
on commercial vessels, for example, is a new strategy
whose use probably expanded. In July 2010, a container with 450 kilos of cocaine was seized in Lagos,
Nigeria, on a vessel arriving from Chile. In January
2011, two other vessels seized in Nigeria had a total of
275 kilos of cocaine,9 one of which contained 110 kilos
arriving from Bolivia.10 Another tactic was to route an
increasing number of containers through Argentina
and Uruguay toward West Africa.11 In November
2012, authorities in Guyana seized 350 kilos of cocaine
hidden in a shipping container filled with soap powder destined for Nigeria.12
West Africa’s emergence as a trafficking nexus was
also symptomatic of a shift in the center of gravity of
the global market for cocaine from the United States
to Europe. This shift occurred due to structural factors including a declining and saturated U.S. cocaine
market, heightened European demand for cocaine, the
stronger euro making sales of this drug more lucrative in Europe,13 the existence of well-developed West
African smuggling networks as ready-made partners,14 and successful interdiction efforts including
anti-money laundering measures15 that drove drug

2

traffickers away from traditional trafficking routes
into North America and Europe, including via the
Caribbean and Spain.16
West Africa’s geographical location between Latin
America and Europe made it an ideal transit zone
for exploitation by powerful drug cartels and terrorist organizations. In this sense, many West African
countries are now suffering the adverse effects of the
geographic accident of lying between the sites of drug
production and the most lucrative consumption markets—much as the Caribbean and Central America
had long suffered from being placed between South
America’s cocaine producers and North America’s cocaine users.17 Dakar, Senegal, for example, is roughly
a midway point between Latin America and Europe,
and is actually 700 miles closer to Recife, Brazil, than
it is to Paris, France.
West Africa’s primary operational allure to traffickers is not actually geography, however, but rather
its low standards of governance, low levels of law
enforcement capacity, and high rates of corruption.18
Traffickers gain competitive advantages by operating
in West African states with the weakest rule of law.19
Powerful cartels and terrorist organizations both
thrive in West Africa’s permissive environment and
its vast ungoverned sea, land, and air spaces.20 West
Africa’s borders—including its maritime domain—are
largely unguarded. The region boasts more than 2,600
miles of coastline. To put things in perspective, the
U.S. Pacific coast (minus Alaska) and Atlantic coast
each are less than 2,100 miles long.21 Then United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Executive
Director Antonio Maria Costa accurately captured
West Africa’s dilemma when he summarized its drug
trafficking situation in 2008:
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Drug planes don’t have to fly below the radar, because
in most cases there is no radar (or electricity). Soldiers
sometimes help smugglers by closing airports and
unloading the cargo. Police cars run out of gas when
giving chase or are left in the dust by smugglers’ allterrain vehicles. There are no local navies to intercept
ships coming from Latin America or to chase 2,000horespower boats that speed drugs up the coast to Europe. Traffickers are seldom brought to trial; in some
cases, there are no prisons to put them in. Even when
they are charged they are usually released because evidence is not collected or needed laws are not in place.22

West Africa’s governance, law enforcement, and
corruption challenges are linked to the subregion‘s
underdevelopment. All but three of 16 nations in West
Africa are on the United Nations (UN) list of “least
developed countries,” including the five countries
with the very lowest levels of human development.23
Ten of the top 41 countries in the “2012 Failed States
Index” were in West Africa (and 25 of the top 41 were
in sub-Saharan Africa).24 Current UNODC Executive
Director Yuri Fedotov framed the linkage between
underdevelopment in the subregion and transnational
crime in February 2012 as follows:
South American drug cartels are exploiting regional
vulnerabilities in West Africa: poverty, unemployment, lack of border control, weakness of law enforcement structures, and endemic corruption. . . . For these
criminals, West Africa represents not only the shortest,
but also the most cost-effective channel for trafficking
illicit drugs to Europe.25

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics and Global Threats William Wechsler
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recently characterized the challenges faced by the
subregion as follows:
West Africa is now facing a situation analogous to the
Caribbean in the 1980s, where small, developing, vulnerable countries along major drug-trafficking routes
toward rich consumers are vastly under-resourced to
deal with the wave of dirty money coming their way.26

HISTORY OF DRUG TRAFFICKING IN WEST
AFRICA
Drug trafficking is not a new phenomenon in West
Africa, but consideration of this history is important
to illuminate the entrenched nature of the drug trade
in the subregion, and its negative implications for
democratic development.27 The historical reality is that
trade routes for illicit (and licit) goods have existed for
hundreds of years in West Africa and are ensconced
in local traditions, especially in the Sahelo-Saharan
region.28 Consistent with this, the pre-independence
economies of West Africa were characterized by a variety of illicit, shadow economies. Cannabis trafficking in West Africa was documented almost a century
ago, in the 1920s, and is still widespread today. Annual cannabis production in West Africa is about 3,500
tons/year.29 There were seizures in September 2011
and February 2012 of five and one tons respectively
of cannabis resin being transported to Europe via
northern Niger in Toyota 4X4s.30 The first documented
use of West Africa as a staging post for international
heroin smuggling dates from 1952, when U.S. officials
noted that parcels of the drug were being transported
by a Lebanese syndicate from Beirut to New York via
Kano, Nigeria, and Accra, Ghana.31 While cocaine trafficking has become a recent focal point of international
5

attention on West Africa, the subregion actually has a
long history of trafficking and organized crime.32 West
Africa received less notoriety, however, only because
the subregion, and indeed all of sub-Saharan Africa,
generally played only a peripheral role in global drug
trafficking prior to the mid-2000s.33
Generally speaking, the roots of West Africa’s
transformation into a major international trade hub
in illegal drugs may be traced to the 1960s. It was
then that the first reports emerged of locally grown
cannabis being exported from Nigeria to Europe in
significant quantities.34 By the 1970s, Ghanaian smugglers had joined Nigerians in exporting Africangrown cannabis to Europe on a scale large enough to
attract sustained official attention. Starting from the
1980s, production, distribution, and consumption of
cannabis provided pathways for the incorporation of
heroin and cocaine into West Africa’s drug trade. At
that time, Nigerian smugglers started sending heroin
by air courier from Pakistan to Nigeria, where it was
repackaged and re-exported to the United States.35 By
the 1990s, Ghana became an early transit point for the
international cocaine trade, and in Accra it was public
knowledge which houses were built by cocaine money, and which flashy cars were cocaine cars.36 Nigeria
still plays a huge role in the international heroin trade,
with intercepted stocks amounting to about 70 kilograms (kg) seized in the country per year.37 Besides
Nigerian and Ghanaian global networks, major new
ones have developed involving Côte d’Ivoire and
Senegal nationals.38
By the 1990s, Nigerian drug traders had largely
finished the process of “internationalizing” their business. Nigerian drug traffickers had not only developed
the means to make bulk shipments of narcotics, but
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had also become fully global, having a “headquarters”
(home) country, business associates in both producing and consuming countries, and facilities in countries outside Nigeria.39 Part of the reason that Nigerian
drug traffickers have been so successful is that their
home country has provided them with a relatively
permissive environment. Perhaps the most important
local partner of Nigerian drug traders in the 1990s was
the Nigerian military, which by then had developed a
high degree of impunity after being in power almost
continuously for many years.40
Within West Africa, Nigerians established operational centers in Cotonou, Benin, and Abidjan, Cote
d’Ivoire.41 Outside the continent, they established
sales networks in major U.S., European and postSoviet Union cities, including Geneva, Switzerland, 42
where they are active in cocaine trafficking, and Moscow, Russia, where they took over heroin retailing.43
In Asia, there are large networks of Nigerian air couriers, some bringing heroin transiting or stopping
in West Africa, and others transporting cocaine and
methamphetamines, ecstasy, and ketamine from West
Africa toward Asia (and Australia); these often transit via Malaysia or Indonesia, to Japan, Korea, China,
Thailand, and Singapore.44 Since 2009, Nigerian and
Ghanaian DTOs diversified into trafficking crystalline
methamphetamine through links with other West African countries such as Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea,
and Senegal.45
LATIN AMERICAN DRUG DEALERS PARTNER
WITH WEST AFRICAN CRIMINALS
One typical way that the Latin American drug cartels operate is to send lieutenants to open legitimate
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businesses in West African nations in order to obtain
their legal residency papers, and start the process of
setting up local illegal networks and front companies to facilitate drug trafficking.46 Once installed, the
Latin Americans partner with transnational organized
crime (TOC) groups in West Africa, particularly Nigerians, for their smuggling and trafficking expertise,
safe houses, storage space, banking, and a host of
other services.47 This is analogous to how Colombian
cartels established links with Mexican syndicates after
the United States significantly choked off the old Caribbean drug transportation corridor and forced the
Colombians to start moving their drug loads across
the southwest border of the United States.48 Mexican
DTOs, including the Sinaloa cartel, are also present in
West Africa.49 There have also been reports of Venezuelans, Surinamese, and European organizations including Italian TOCs operating in the same territory.50
The degree to which Latin American traffickers
rely on West African partners, and the nature of these
partnerships, depend heavily on the quality of law enforcement in each African country. In countries such
as Guinea-Bissau, which has extremely weak governance, Latin American cartels need only bribe the
only institution with real power—the military—and
are then able to enjoy de facto freedom from prosecution. In other countries, such as Ghana, which has an
emerging democratic tradition and stronger state institutions, Latin American cartels rely more on local
partners, thus insulating themselves from possible arrest by local authorities. Not surprisingly, while law
enforcement authorities continue to arrest low-level
narcotics traffickers, Ghana has had relatively limited
success in pursuing Latin American partners and their
Ghanaian drug baron partners.51
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STRUCTURE OF WEST AFRICAN DTOS
The general structure of most West African criminal networks has distinctive characteristics typical of
lineage-based societies.52 Criminal enterprises in West
Africa use similar techniques to those of legitimate
traders and business people: A successful individual
entrepreneur invites one or more junior relatives or
dependents to join him or her in a business deal.53
West African criminal networks, in general, have certain prime characteristics, including:
•	Small, compartmentalized cells of between two
and 10 members;
•	Mostly kinsmen from the same ethnic group or
tribe;
• The ability to communicate mostly in indigenous, African languages;
• Making deals and then dispersing, regrouping
at a later date as needed;
• Adopting false identities for its members,
including changing their nationality; and,
• Refraining from the use of violence in order not
to attract the attention of law enforcement
officials.54
Some observers have juxtaposed so-called “horizontally” structured African criminal gangs with
the so-called “vertically” structured Latin American
cartels. This is a flawed analogy, however, as West
African societies remain relatively traditional and hierarchical. The West African modus operandi closely
resembles an “adhocracy,” which is able to fuse experts drawn from different disciplines into smoothly
functioning, yet, ad hoc project teams.55 This stands in
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contrast to the more corporate-style relations of classic
American mafias. Moreover, “informal” or “ad hoc”
is not intended to imply that West African traffickers
are not capable. A senior U.S. anti-drug official once
described Nigerian drug networks as “some of the
most sophisticated and finely-tuned transshipment,
money–moving and document-forging organizations
in the world.”56 West African trafficking groups have
shown a high degree of flexibility in their amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS) trafficking routes by using couriers from countries outside the region, e.g.,
from Eastern Europe or Asia, and by diversifying their
routes, which are mostly by air.57
Nigerian drug traffickers are also “decentralized
and diversified” into TOC lines of business, including
“illicit drugs, prostitution, and scams.”58 Consistent
with this, Nigerians dominate the markets for cocaine
and prostitution in Rome, Milan, Naples, Genoa, and
other Italian cities, in collaboration with the Calabrese
and Camorra mafia,59 and may be more accurately
considered to be TOC members than merely DTOs.
This being said, most indigenous organized crime
groups in West Africa, with the Nigerians and Ghanaians being exceptions, have historically lacked the sophistication of global drug trafficking cartels. Unfortunately, West Africans are catching up by partnering
and learning from the Latin American drug cartels.60
GLOBAL DRUG TRAFFICKING ROUTES VIA
WEST AFRICA
Global drug trafficking routes that pass through
or originate in West Africa vary by the type of drug
involved:
1. Heroin. This drug is principally smuggled by
West African criminal groups from Afghanistan and
10

Pakistan, through Iran and other Middle Eastern
countries, on to East or Southern Africa, then to West
Africa before being transported to the United States
and Europe. Nigeria and Ghana are the principal transit zones in West Africa, with Cote d’Ivoire another
key transit country.61 By contrast, heroin coming from
South America, especially Colombia, often traverses
the Atlantic to West Africa, only to cross back to North
American markets.62 In both routes, heroin is transported from the source zone by a variety of means,
including maritime containers, go-fast boats, small
wooden fishing vessels called dhows, air drops at sea,
air cargo, and luggage and body-carried by couriers
or “mules.”63
Nigerian nationals accounted for 32 percent of drug
trafficking arrests in Pakistan from 2000-08, with Ghanaian, Guineans, and Ivoirians accounting for 1 percent each.64 During July 2011, the DEA Office in Accra,
in coordination with the Ghana Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU), concluded an investigation targeting
a Ghana-based organization responsible for shipping
multikilogram quantities of heroin from West Africa
to the United States. That month, U.S. federal agents
took down an international heroin-trafficking ring
that moved heroin from Ghana to Dulles International
Airport outside of Washington, DC.65
Smaller countries in West Africa are also touched
by the international heroin trade. In May 2011, the
DEA Office in Lagos, Nigeria, in coordination with
DEA Islamabad and the Benin judicial police, interdicted 200 kgs of heroin from Pakistan that was in
transit in Cotonou, Benin. This undercover operation
resulted in the single largest heroin seizure in Benin’s
history, and the arrest of three Beninese and one Togolese in Benin and several arrests in Pakistan.66
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2. Methamphetamine. Illicit manufacture of methamphetamine is not entirely new to the African continent. Since 2004, regular reports of illicit manufacture
of the substance have been received from South Africa.67 Since 2007, the DEA has assisted with the seizure
of several other multiton pseudoephedrine and ephedrine shipments in Africa that have been linked to Mexican DTOs68 in Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Mozambique.69
Mexican cartels are gaining a foothold in West Africa, where their traffickers are being used as advisors
and possibly being recruited as chemists in the illicit
manufacture of methamphetamine.70
West Africa has been a transshipment area for
precursor chemicals diverted for methamphetamine
production since at least 2009, with large increases in
shipments through Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, and Senegal,71
and with Nigeria and Ghana as likely production hubs
based on increased precursor shipments. The added
danger with ATS is that, unlike cocaine and heroin,
illicit ATS manufacture does not rely on the cultivation of naturally occurring plants such as the coca
leaf or opium poppy and, as such, is not limited to
certain geographic locations—leaving the possibility
that West Africa could be transformed not only into
a key transit point for ATS, but into a manufacturing
hub as well.72 The DEA has already documented the
emergence of West Africa as a significant production
point of origin for multikilogram methamphetamine
shipments to the Far East.
Evidence was uncovered in July 2009 of intended
ATS manufacture in Guinea, with precursor chemicals sufficient to manufacture ecstasy worth over $100
million.73 In April 2010, 36 kilos of crystal metham-
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phetamine destined for Japan and five kilos of methamphetamine destined for the United States via South
Africa were seized on cargo planes in Nigeria.74 In June
2010, Cote d’Ivoire officials seized precursor chemicals
acetone destined for Benin and methyl ethyl ketone
destined for Guinea.75 In 2010, the International Narcotics Control Board reportedly stopped shipments of
500 kg and 200 kg of ephedrine headed for Guinea and
Niger.76 In 2010, the United States Government indicted members of a large international cocaine trafficking organization for, inter alia, the intent to establish
a clandestine laboratory in Liberia for the large-scale
manufacture of methamphetamine that would have
been destined for Japan and the United States.77
Because of limited reporting to UNODC by West
African countries, the best measure of the escalating
situation appears to be reports coming from countries
in East and Southeast Asia of the increasing involvement of West African nationals. While China and Taiwan have traditionally been the source countries for
methamphetamine smuggled into Japan, the proportion of seized methamphetamine trafficked into Japan
from Africa rose from 7.4 percent in 2009 to 36 percent
in the first half of 2010, mostly from Nigeria.78
The most common destinations for methamphetamine trafficked through Africa have been Japan, followed by Korea. Since March 2010, numerous arrests
of couriers in Asia attempting to smuggle methamphetamine from Africa indicates African drug syndicates produce the drug for export throughout the
Asia-Pacific region, with most of the Africa-sourced
methamphetamine destined for sale in Japan following transshipment through countries such as Malaysia79 and Thailand.80 In May 2011, there were two
seizures in Nigeria of 63 kilos of methamphetamines
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and 26 kilos of amphetamines destined for Japan, and
a seizure in Senegal of one kilo of methamphetamine
from a courier from Togo heading to Japan. According to a European police official based in Africa, Nigerian criminal networks were building links to Japan’s
yakuza criminal gangs.81
French anti-drug officials agree that most methamphetamine production in West Africa is destined
for East and Southeast Asia, including also China,
Cambodia, Vietnam, and the Philippines.82 Since 2010,
West African groups, particularly Nigerians, have
trafficked methamphetamine to New Zealand83 and
likely Australia as well.
In 2011, the DEA and Nigeria’s drug enforcement
agency jointly initiated two additional investigations
targeting clandestine methamphetamine operators
either based in Nigeria or selling their labs’ illicit production in Nigeria. These operators are actively seeking organized criminal group assistance in legally
importing and then diverting large-scale quantities
of precursor chemicals into Nigeria to increase their
methamphetamine production capacity.84 An operating methamphetamine laboratory was discovered in
Lagos, Nigeria, in June 2011, which was estimated to
be capable of producing 150-200 kgs per week.85 A second operational lab was seized in February 2012, and
one Nigerian and three Bolivians arrested—suggesting possible cooperation with Latin American criminal syndicates.86
Togo’s Security and Protection Minister was quoted in August 2012 as saying that the drug trafficking
situation in West Africa has reached “worrying proportions . . . especially after the illegal setting up of
laboratories to manufacture amphetamine drugs in
the subregion.”87 While West Africa is not currently an

14

important source region for the importation of methamphetamine drugs into the United States, it may
become so in the future. As Senator Dianne Feinstein
pointed out during a Senate hearing that she chaired
in May 2012:
Methamphetamine and other illegal drugs produced in
Africa could very well make their way to U.S. markets
one day. Some methamphetamine currently produced
in Africa is being shipped all the way to Southeast
Asia. There is no reason to believe that methamphetamine produced in Africa could not make it into the
United States in the future.88

Senator Feinstein’s concerns are well placed. Most
countries in West Africa do not have the legislative
and institutional frameworks necessary to control precursor trafficking. As has been the case with heroin
and cocaine, traffickers are taking advantage of the
subregion’s permissive environment to import chemical precursors and, increasingly, use these locally in
the illicit manufacturing of ATS drugs.89
3. Cocaine. Colombia produces about 54 percent of
the refined cocaine on the world market, with the rest
coming from Bolivia and Peru.90 Prior to about 2004,
cocaine destined for Europe had followed a northerly
route from South America, through the eastern Caribbean to Spain’s Canary Islands and Portugal’s Azores
Islands, to clandestine landing zones on the coast of
Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands or to commercial
ports such as Barcelona, Rotterdam, and Antwerp.91
Besides Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands, other
major European entry points for cocaine included
France and Italy.92

15

However, heightened U.S. anti-drug and counterterrorism law enforcement and border control efforts,
coupled with U.S. and European interdiction, forced
smuggling further south to destinations in West Africa from Mauritania to as far south and east as Nigeria.93 Around 2004, West Africans began to provide
logistical assistance to South American cocaine traffickers in organizing their West African maritime
shipments to Europe from at least two subregions: one
centered on Guinea-Bissau and Guinea in the western
Gulf of Guinea, and the other centered on the Bight of
Benin, including Ghana, Togo, Benin, and Nigeria.94
This first subregion was along Latitude 10 North between northern South America and the western part
of Africa’s coast, and became so important that law
enforcement agencies dubbed it “Highway 10.”95
Europol has recently confirmed that former hashishsmuggling routes are also being used by cocaine traffickers.96 These routes may involve Moroccan nationals
who have gained smuggling expertise through years
of trafficking hashish across the Mediterranean.97 Algeria is also an important hub for drugs of all kinds,
with numerous reports of the arrests of couriers.98
In 2007, U.S. and international authorities estimated that approximately 80 percent of cocaine traveling
from Latin America to Africa moved by sea and 20
percent by air.99 There may be as many as 100 ships
that cross the Atlantic every year transporting drugs
to West Africa.100 Anecdotal evidence suggests cartels have even used submarines.101 The largest known
loads of cocaine en route to Europe via West Africa
have been transported by large commercial fishing
or freight “mother ships” that hand off shipments to
smaller, faster boats outside territorial waters (including fishing boats, sailing yachts, and speedboats).102
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According to Europol, the crews of these smaller vessels are often West African, with Spanish or South
American “controllers.”103
In addition to ships, about 60 illicit aircraft regularly make the cross-Atlantic journey, benefiting from
an abundance of landing strips and limited air traffic
control.104 After arriving in West Africa, the cocaine is
transported in small quantities by couriers on commercial flights, and sometimes by air freight or by
smugglers across the Sahara to North Africa and then
Europe.105 A 2008 Department of Homeland Security
report warned of a growing fleet of rogue aircraft
crisscrossing the Atlantic—at least 10 aircraft, including executive jets, twin-engine turboprops, and aging Boeing 727s.106 UNODC reported in 2010 that a
number of modified aircraft had taken off from Venezuela toward West Africa, “notably to Cape Verde,
Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, and Sierra Leone.”107
Some smaller aircraft are modified for the transatlantic voyage by the inclusion of additional fuel tanks.108
Some airports or landing strips are also in the Sahara-Sahel.109 In November 2009, a burned Boeing 727
was found in the desert of northern Mali after having
served to transport several tons of cocaine on a flight
from Venezuela.110 One affluent area of Gao, in northeastern Mali, had been known as “Cocainebougou”—
at least until the March 2012 Al-Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM)/Touareg takeover of that city. 111
Much of Colombia’s cocaine exports to Europe
are now passing through Venezuela and Brazil and
then transiting through West Africa via air and ship.
A significant portion of the Bolivian (and, to a lesser
degree, Peruvian) cocaine shipments are also moving
by air via Venezuela, in part because of the “Bolivarian Revolutionary” alliance between Bolivian Presi-

17

dent Evo Morales, himself a coca farmer before rising
to power, and Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez.112
Several of the largest cocaine busts in West Africa have
come aboard aircraft that departed from Venezuela.113
The majority of the Bolivian and Peruvian cocaine
is moved through Brazil and then onward to Africa.
There are linguistic as well as geographic reasons for
the Brazil connection. Guinea-Bissau, and Cape Verde,
two of the most active transshipment hubs, are former
Portuguese colonies, like Brazil.114 This Brazil connection was facilitated by increased air transport links
between Brazil and Africa. Consistent with this, in
November 2011, there were two seizures at the Lagos,
Nigeria, airport from passengers on a Qatar Airlines
flight from Sao Paulo, Brazil.115 Brazil is now rivaling
Venezuela as the number one point of departure for
cocaine transported to Africa.
Wholesale Distribution and Sale Shifts to
West Africa.
In recent years, Latin American traffickers also relocated a share of their wholesale distribution from the
Western Hemisphere to West Africa. This means that
the subregion has moved from being merely a shortterm transit point to becoming a storage and staging
area for wholesale repackaging, re-routing, and sometimes (re-)sale of drugs.116 It also means, as Antonio
Mazzitelli, UNODC regional representative for West
and Central Africa, put it, that “West Africa is changing more and more from being just a stockpiling place
into a hub where cocaine is traded.”117
Recent UNODC drug seizure data of stockpiled cocaine suggest that multiple subregional repackaging
and redistribution trafficking patterns have emerged
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in the Economic Community of West African States’s
(ECOWAS's) 15 member-states, as well as Mauritania
and Morocco. In recent years, there were confirmed
cases of traffickers who stockpiled cocaine in Nigeria,
Benin, Togo, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal,
Cape Verde, and Mauritania. One route involves cocaine entering Guinea-Bissau that is then routed to
Senegal, Guinea, Gambia, and Mali for onward transport to Europe.118 Leopold Senghor International Airport in Dakar is known to be a crucial departure point
in West Africa en route to Europe. Bamako’s international airport has become another important transit
point for drug traffickers, especially Nigerians, transporting drugs to Europe.119 Another route involves
Cape Verde, where in October 2011 the DEA worked
with local and Dutch authorities to make the largest
recorded cocaine seizure in that country’s history.120
One academic, citing news reports, has written
that:
Nigerian middlemen have also played a leading role
in the development of a trans–Saharan route for smuggling cocaine into Europe, sometimes using Touareg
guides. In early 2008, Malian authorities seized
750 kilos of cocaine at Tinzawatine in the middle of
the Sahara. . . . Once cocaine reaches North Africa,
established Moroccan hashish smugglers can take it
to Europe.121

In June 2011, French law enforcement separately
assisted in the seizure of 400 kgs of cocaine destined
for Niger.122
Latin American groups are employing West Africans to handle cocaine shipments in West Africa, paying for these services in cocaine. This has led to two
parallel systems of importation to Europe: one involv-
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ing larger quantities remaining under South American
control, and one involving smaller quantities owned
by West Africans. The former is more likely to use
maritime shipments, while the latter more often uses
couriers on commercial air flights, a favored technique
of West African groups worldwide.123 A typical West
African air courier tactic is the so-called “shotgun approach,” in which as many as 30 couriers are placed on
board a single flight with the knowledge that customs
officers only have the capacity to arrest and process
a limited number of them. Some traffickers will put
couriers on a single commercial flight from places like
Accra, Ghana, to the European Union (EU), and will
then give the name of one courier to the authorities
on the receiving end to focus law enforcement on that
individual, allowing the remainder to proceed unchecked.124 Finally, the wider availability of cocaine at
the wholesale level and the consequent development
of a regional market have generated a new group of
operators, the “freelancers.” These people, often Europeans or West Africans with valid resident permits
in Europe, invest their savings in the purchase of a
couple of kilos of cocaine with the objective of smuggling it to Europe.125
LINK TO TERRORISM: ALLIANCES BETWEEN
DRUG TRAFFICKERS AND TERRORISTS
Criminal enterprises are evolving into new hybrid
organizations that blur the traditional distinction between organized crime and terrorism.126 There is evidence that some of these hybrid organizations have
ties to West Africa. Both groups exploit the same state
weaknesses and are increasingly overlapping in using
the same “shadow facilitators,” or criminal specialists,
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for money laundering, weapons trafficking, human
trafficking, smuggling, document forgery, transportation, security, and strategic corruption.127
These growing links in West Africa between drug
trafficking, other forms of transnational organized
crime, and international terrorism represent a new security threat to the United States. Consistent with this,
President Obama’s Strategy to Combat Transnational
Organized Crime, released in July 2011, declared organized crime to be a national security threat, and was
a significant step forward in addressing this “crimeterror-insurgency nexus.”128 Four terrorist groups or
state sponsors of terrorism active in drug trafficking
in West Africa are:
1. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC). There are precedents in other regions of
the world for terrorists using the drug trade to finance their activities. In 2010, 18 of 44 international
terrorist groups designated by the United States had
been linked to some aspect of the international drug
trade.129 Through much of the 1990s and 2000s, the
FARC funded its insurgency in Colombia through cocaine production and kidnapping.130 President Chávez
in Venezuela has allowed the FARC, with whom
many observers believe he has a deep and personal
relationship, to establish routes through his country
that greatly lessen the threat and the cost of moving
cocaine.131 Some of the cocaine-smuggling operations
in West Africa have been linked to the FARC, including an April 2007 arrest and subsequent unexplained
release in Guinea-Bissau of two FARC officials in connection with the discovery of a large consignment
of cocaine.132 In May 2010, an investigation targeting
two DTOs revealed that six tons of cocaine purchased
from the FARC were transported on a plane originating in Venezuela and transited Liberia for eventual
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distribution into Europe and the United States.133 This
successful investigation was made possible by the
cooperation of Liberian officials, including the Director of National Security, who is the son of President
Sirleaf Johnson.134
2. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).
Other international terrorist groups already present
in West Africa are also increasingly engaging in drug
trafficking to finance their activities, including the
likely purchase of sophisticated weaponry. According
to UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, an assessment
mission dispatched in December 2011 to look at the effects of the Libya crisis on the Sahel found that terrorist groups such as AQIM had begun to form alliances
with drug traffickers and other criminal syndicates.135
The link to AQIM takes on particular significance in
light of this terrorist organization’s March 2012 takeover of northern Mali, along with the AQIM splinter
group Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa
(MUJAO) and Touareg allies such as Ansar Dine.136
In December 2009, the DEA’s Ghanaian counterparts arrested three suspected members and facilitators of AQIM based upon a United States arrest warrant stemming from a narco-terrorism indictment in
the Southern District of New York. The charges in this
case marked the first time that associates of al-Qaeda
had been charged with narco-terrorism offenses. All
three defendants pleaded guilty.137 AQIM has profited
from North Africa’s drug smuggling and West Africa’s assorted smuggling enterprises, such as in Mali
and Western Sahara.138 AQIM collects a “tax” on traffickers who pass through territory under its control.139
Touareg rebels in the north of Mali and Niger have
also been involved in trans-Saharan trafficking.140
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3. Hezbollah. Given the prominence of the Lebanese diaspora community in West Africa and its
members’ control of pipelines to import and export
illegal commodities, it was inevitable that those organizations and the drug trafficking groups would link
up.141 A U.S. investigation codenamed Operation TITAN unraveled a Lebanese-dominated syndicate that
linked members of the Lebanese diaspora in North
and South America and Nigeria with partners in their
Mediterranean homeland.142 In January 2011, a Lebanese national, Ayman Joumaa, was placed on a U.S.
Treasury Department Office of Foreign Asset Control
(OFAC) blacklist for cocaine trafficking and money
laundering for a network operating in West Africa,
Lebanon, Colombia, and Panama.143
Hezbollah, an international terrorist group with
links to the Lebanese diaspora, relies on independent,
transnational criminal specialists in West Africa with
close links to the drug trade for money laundering,
document forgery, and other criminal activities.144 Historically, Hezbollah had a significant role in the blood
diamond trade. In addition, many in the Lebanese diaspora community in West Africa, numbering several
hundred thousand, pay a portion of their earnings
to support Hezbollah in Lebanon, with the knowledge and acquiescence of host governments in the
subregion. The importance of this revenue stream was
revealed when a charter flight bound for Beirut from
Cotonou, Benin, crashed on takeoff on December 25,
2003. On board was a Hezbollah “foreign relations”
official carrying $2 million in contributions raised in
the region.145
A DEA investigation into the Lebanese Canadian
Bank illustrates why Hezbollah’s activities in West
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Africa are of concern.146 In February 2011, the U.S. Department of the Treasury, working with the DEA, listed the Lebanese Canadian Bank and its subsidiaries as
a financial institution of concern for money laundering. This investigation uncovered a complex scheme
that moved illegal drugs from South America to Europe and the Middle East via West Africa and masked
the proceeds through sales of used cars and consumer
goods.147 This bank and its subsidiaries were involved
in money laundering of hundreds of millions of dollars per month. Its subsidiary in Gambia, Prime Bank,
is owned by a Lebanese national believed to be a
Hezbollah supporter.148 Treasury found complex links
between the bank and drug traffickers to Hezbollah.
(Treasury and the DEA were also able to link individuals in Iran to this criminal money laundering and
drug smuggling network.149)
4. Iran. Because of a possible link to terrorism financing, the DEA has targeted on a priority basis Iranian distribution networks involved in sending heroin
to West Africa for onward shipment to the United
States. In May 2010, an investigation involving the
DEA office in Accra, Ghana, resulted in the seizure of
80 kgs of heroin contained in eight industrial metal
gears that had arrived via air cargo from Tehran, Iran.
In November 2010, a joint investigation by the DEA
and the Nigerian Drug Law Enforcement Agency resulted in the seizure of 118 kgs of Southwest Asian
(SWA) heroin in a commercial shipping container
originating in Iran. In June 2011, the DEA Paris Office, in coordination with the French Customs Service,
searched a crate which led to the discovery of two
200-gram packages of heroin contained within each of
the 26 cylinders, for a total net weight of 10.4 kgs of
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heroin. The shipment from Iran was going to transit
Paris on its way to West Africa.150
IMPACT ON GOOD GOVERNANCE
UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, speaking before the UN Security Council in February 2012 about
peace, security, and stability in West Africa and the
Sahel, stated that:
Transnational organized crime, including drug trafficking, affects peace, security and stability wherever
it occurs. It undermines the authority and effectiveness of State institutions, erodes the rule of law and
weakens law enforcement structures.151

Secretary General Ban is correct to be concerned
about West Africa. Some analysts believe that the
damage done to governance in West Africa due to
the drug trade has already reached the point that
some governments in the subregion are “dominated
by criminal networks,”152 and that their sovereignty
and even viability as independent rule of law based
entities is in jeopardy.153 As UNODC put it, West
African states:
. . . risk becoming shell-states; sovereign in name, but
hollowed out from the inside by criminals in collusion
with corrupt officials in the government and the security services. This not only jeopardized their survival,
it poses a serious threat to regional security because of
the trans-national nature of the crimes.154
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In short, these violent nonstate actors may represent, over time, an existential threat to the viability of
West African states and thus the greatest challenge
to human security in the subregion since resource
conflicts rocked several countries starting in the
early-1990s.
“Narco-Corruption” Fuels Coups D’État, Buys
Political Power/Protection.
There is little doubt that the proceeds of drug
trafficking are indeed fueling a dramatic increase in
narco-corruption in West Africa. UNODC indicated in
a 2010 report that the drug trade in West Africa appears to be controlled by national figures so powerful
that little opposition is possible, but where disputes
over illicit markets “can lead to the toppling of governments.”155 Mauritanian national Ahmedou Ould
Abdallah—the UN’s former Special Representative of
the Secretary General for West Africa, Somalia, and
Burundi—stated in a February 2012 interview that
“several West African leaders, through family ties or
their own contacts, were connected to the drug trade
in the region.” He felt that politics in West Africa already had “gangrene” because of drug corruption
and that:
One can imagine the problems that Westerners will
have working with the countries of West Africa in
a few years—if not now—when one sees how much
trouble the United States is having now working with
Latin America [on the drug issue].156

With the presence of large amounts of money, drug
traffickers can stage coups d’état, hijack elections, and
buy political power. In Guinea-Bissau, at least the
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last two coups d’état have been directly or indirectly
linked to a fight for control of the drug trade. In drug
trafficking hubs such as Ghana and Nigeria, members
of Parliament, police officials, and government ministers have been implicated in drug smuggling over
the past year.157 The largest seizure of heroin in New
York in 2006 was made from a shipment originating
from Ghana and belonging to a Ghanaian member
of parliament who was not subsequently suspended
from his position in government.158 In January 2011,
then Ghanaian President Atta-Mills called in Western
diplomats for a private meeting at which he reassured
them of Ghana’s resolve in the fight against illicit
drugs in order to dissipate doubts following revelations that Ghana’s national drug bureau had actively
collaborated with drug traffickers to torpedo a United
Kingdom (UK) anti-drug operation involving cocaine
and heroin transiting Ghana en route to the UK.159
Drug trafficking is a major problem for the Government of Sierra Leone—a recovering failed state at risk
of regression because of illicit drugs.160 In Sierra Leone, the Minister of Transportation resigned after his
brother was implicated in the country’s largest cocaine
seizure,161 but was rehired despite this scandal.162 In
Mauritania, the son of former President Ould Haidalla
was arrested on cocaine-trafficking charges.163
Framing the seriousness of the governance challenge, one academic wrote recently that:
Cocaine trafficking is becoming integral to how West
Africa is governed. Political actors are using criminal
organization as an aspect of statecraft, and criminal
actors are using political privileges as business assets.
Traffickers get access to state immunities, passport and
diplomatic bags, airspace and maritime approaches,
and even state-owned vessels. National political and
military institutions are in turn used to tax the trade.164
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One Ghanaian academic recently said that narcotics were the top challenge now facing West Africa,
both for “functional states” such as Ghana, and “nonfunctional” states such as Guinea-Bissau.165 Worsening the situation is the fact that many ruling elites
in West Africa, fearing internal coups and yet facing
little threat of external aggression, systematically allowed their militaries to deteriorate in the years after independence.166 These elites also kept their law
enforcement and justice systems underdeveloped
and corrupt, with police chiefs in many West African countries being appointed directly by the president and dependent on the head of state’s support
and patronage for resources, promotion, and the job
itself.167 Drug traffickers are able to offer law enforcement officials in West Africa more than they could
earn in a lifetime simply to look the other way.168
Some ruling elites are even tempted to use anti-drug
campaigns as a mechanism to weaken political opposition.169 Anti-corruption bodies have also been very
weak, often serving as yet another mechanism for
purging domestic opposition instead of cleaning up
deficient institutions.170
UNODC’s current Representative for West Africa
said in June 2011 that a big part of the problem is a
weakness in the subregion of the judicial and penal
systems, where there remains a “culture of impunity.”
Up to then, he added, no country in West Africa had
ever brought a case in its judicial system for laundering drug money. This representative asserted that the
international community had focused its efforts on
law enforcement, and had done little to strengthen
the judicial systems.171 Consistent with this, a French
national was convicted in Nouakchott, Mauritania,
in February 2010, along with a police commissioner,
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a former International Criminal Police Organization
(INTERPOL) representative, and local businessman,
of transporting 760 kilos of cocaine in a minibus in August 2007. In August 2011, however, the court of appeals reversed the convictions and freed the accused.
In September 2011, the Mauritania Supreme Court
reversed the appeals court decision, fired the head of
the appeals court, and punished four other judges for
their decision to reverse the convictions.172
Even when officials are not corrupt, state-paid
prosecutors are usually no match for the best defense
lawyers that drug money can buy.173 Not surprisingly, when drug trafficking surges, the legal system
becomes overburdened with court cases related to
drugs in one way or another—when there are even
applicable laws in place to indict individuals, let alone
prosecute and incarcerate them.
Drugs—A New Form of Resource Conflict?
In the post-independence period in West Africa,
much of political conflict focused on gaining access to
the state in order to control rents from various legal,
semi-illegal, or outright illegal resource economies—
such as diamonds, gold and other precious metals,
stones, and timber (Liberia, and Sierra Leone), oil
(Nigeria) and fishing. The latter is often conducted illegally and destructively by international fleets from
outside West Africa.174 Since the early-1990s, this conflict in West Africa devolved into protracted violent
clashes and civil wars that, as one academic testified:
centered on natural resources, particularly diamonds,
timber, oil, and gold. Profits from these resource wars
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fueled the rise of the Revolutionary United Front
(RUF) in Sierra Leone, for example, fed the wars sustained by Liberia’s Charles Taylor and contributed to
the rampant corruption and weak or failed institutions
in almost every country of the sub-region. At the same
time, these kinds of natural resources, while valuable,
pale in comparison to the money now generated by
the cocaine trade in West Africa. For example, at its
peak, the total annual value of the ‘blood diamond’
trade smuggled out of Sierra Leone and Liberia was
less than $200 million. . . . The potential to fuel conflicts
over the cocaine pipeline, the most lucrative commodity so far and one whose profits are several orders of
magnitude larger than diamonds, is truly frightening. . . . Just as the ‘blood diamond’ trade and illicit
timber deals allowed groups like the RUF to purchase
advanced weapons on the international market, the
influx of cocaine cash will allow the criminal and militia groups in the region to acquire ever more sophisticated armaments, training, and communications. 175

Separatists in Senegal’s Casamance Region are already using the drug trade to finance their rebellion,
and while they have historically used the sale of cannabis to do so,176 it is logical to assume that cocaine
revenues will eventually contribute to this ongoing
instability, if they have not already.
Even if West Africa does not see a return of civil
wars or rebellions, diplomats and other international officials worry that some West African countries
could develop “along similar lines to Mexico, where
drug gangs have a symbiotic relationship with political parties and with the state and drug-related violence results in thousands of deaths every year.”177 The
current UNODC Representative for Mexico, Antonio
Mazzitelli, who was also previously its representative
for West Africa, believes that West Africa could see far
greater violence, much like “small gangs in Jamaica,”
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such as those by drug kingpin Christopher “Dudus”
Coke, who was extradited to the United States in
2010.178 One academic hypothesized that where there
is political sponsorship of drug trafficking, violence
can be relatively low, but that:
. . . where sponsorship is contested, violence results. In
January 2011, for example, a major battle was fought
between Berabiche Arabs running drugs to Libya, and
Touareg [tribesmen] who demanded a fee for passing
through their territory.179

Latin American drug gangs themselves could also
be the source of killings and other violence in West
Africa, adding to the region’s instability. Many of the
Mexican cartel wars are, in essence, resource wars,
with the merchandise in dispute being not only the
trafficked drugs but the physical trafficking hubs
through which the illicit goods must pass. In other
words, the criminal pipeline itself can become a resource in dispute, and one of the primary sources of
violence.180 There is also a risk that rivalries between
various African networks of corrupt politicians or
military officials could lead to violence—something some analysts believe has already occurred in
Guinea-Bissau.
Whether similar cartel wars could break out in Africa is uncertain. Some skeptics assert that such violence would not be consistent with the way disputes
are handled in West Africa; it may also be the case that
governance is so weak that there are multiple channels or pipelines to traffic through the subregion’s
16 countries, and therefore little reason to fight over
them. One exception, however, could involve fighting
for control of choice island landing strips in GuineaBissau, which, with the collusion of a weak host government, are particularly valuable pipelines.
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Civil society can also be intimidated and muzzled
by the drug trade. There have been significant instances of interference with the freedom of the press
by some officials in Guinea-Bissau related to media reports on drug trafficking and alleged related corruption in the military. According to the report of the UN
Secretary General on the mission to Guinea-Bissau in
September 2007:
The period from July to August 2007 was marked by
tensions over concerns by civil society organizations
regarding what they saw as pressures relating to freedom of the press and freedom of expression in connection with their reports on drug trafficking.

A November 2007 report from Reporters Without
Borders recounts how Guinea-Bissau journalists had
received death threats from senior military officials.
One brave Ghanaian investigative journalist released
an undercover video showing numerous customs
agency officials taking bribes at Tema Harbor in February 2012.181 Human rights can also become a casualty when drug traffickers are calling the shots.182
Drug Trade Not a Threat to Political Stability?
One contrarian—and some would say cynical—
view is that it is incorrect to assume that “the drug
trade epidemic” in West Africa will necessarily challenge political stability and threaten existing governments. One academic has written that, “To the extent
that a governing elite captures rents from the drug
trade, a symbiosis between foreign (and national)
drug traffickers and the ruling elites may develop”183—analogous to what has occurred in Jamaica.184
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In this view, drug traffickers enjoy a sponsored safe
haven, and the stability of the existing political status
quo is reinforced—making it harder to root out these
entrenched interests.185
The fundamental problem with this view, however, is that the short-term stability of having nondemocratic ruling elites enter into “symbiotic” relationships
with drug traffickers will in the long-term choke off
democratic evolution in West Africa. The stability of
this alliance lasts only until the next group of wannabe leaders acts to mount a coup or launch an insurgency—thereby perpetuating a new form of resource
conflict in West Africa. Guinea-Bissau’s instability
is evidence of this point in terms of this nation having a briefly stable “alliance” over the drug proceeds
that became unsustainable as different segments then
started to compete for control of this illicit trade.
Guinea-Bissau—Already a Narco-State.
In West Africa, Guinea-Bissau is generally recognized as a narco-state where state-capture has already
occurred.186 A “narco-state” has been defined as a nation that has been taken over and is controlled and
corrupted by drug cartels and where law enforcement
is effectively nonexistent.187 In Guinea-Bissau, drug
trafficking networks penetrated the highest levels of
power, including the office of former President Joao
Bernardo Vieira, who was assassinated in March 2009.
As a result of such corruption, the narcotics trade
flourished and likely now surpasses the entire formal value of the national economy.188 Military leaders
have since been designated “drug kingpins” by the
U.S. Government. Ex-Navy Chief of Staff Jose Americo Bubo Na Tchuto, for example, was listed as a drug
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kingpin in April 2010 by the U.S. Department of the
Treasury,189and then reinstated by the Guinea-Bissau
government as the head of the Navy a few months later. Armed Forces Chief Antonio Injai reportedly had
been competing with Tchuto for a larger share of drug
profits,190 with the former controlling airports, and
the latter, maritime shipments.191 Ibrahima Camara,
the head of Guinea-Bissau’s air force, is also involved
in drug trafficking. One observer believes that the involvement of the Guinea-Bissau armed forces in the
drug trade is so entrenched that there exists a generational tension between an old guard that has access to
drug revenues, and a younger generation of officers
that wants its share.192
One researcher has argued that Guinea-Bissau is
most consistent with a failed state, not a narco-state.
This researcher argues that, while certain organs of
the state in Guinea-Bissau may have been captured
through narco-corruption (the military and criminal
justice sector), one cannot say that the capacity of the
state has been altered, because of its extremely limited
capacity to begin with.193 This researcher’s distinction,
while more definitional than substantive, may nevertheless be useful because it implies that international
assistance to Guinea-Bissau’s police authorities may
help create a beachhead within the state against narco-corruption. While weak compared to the military,
police authorities, in alliance with civil society, could
help lead a fight in the future to recapture GuineaBissau from narco-traffickers.
Both the United States and the broader international community, through the UN, are working to
assist police and judicial authorities in Guinea-Bissau.
Guinea-Bissau’s Transnational Crime Unit (TCU) was
the result of work that UNODC started in 2008 with
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the Guinea-Bissau Judicial Police to set up a specialized unit to increase the number of investigations into
drug trafficking and organized crime.194 The TCU was
expanded in 2011 to branches of the Judicial Police in
two key remote locations of the country: the Island of
Bubaque in the Bijagós Archipelago and Catió in the
south of Guinea-Bissau. UNODC has also worked to
strengthen the justice system and rule of law structures, most notably by training judges and prosecutors specializing in cases related to drug trafficking
and organized crime.195
Assistant Secretary of State Johnnie Carson, in a
May 2012 Senate testimony, listed three key lines of
efforts for the United States in Guinea-Bissau needed
to fight drug trafficking, beyond working to restore
civilian authority and constitutional rule of law. The
first was to work alongside international partners in
applying targeted sanctions (e.g., travel bans and asset freezes) on the worst or most vulnerable offenders.
The second was to continue to pursue security sector reform in Guinea-Bissau—to remove corrupt elements from its military, strengthen law enforcement,
and instill respect for civilian government. Third was
to pursue a policy of “containment” by helping Guinea-Bissau’s neighbors improve the capacity of their
customs, border, and port authorities.196
With regard to Assistant Secretary Carson’s second key line of effort, the U.S. Department of State’s
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) funded two new positions in June
2011, dedicated to Guinea-Bissau: a Regional Law Enforcement Advisor and a Justice Sector Advisor. The
Regional Law Enforcement Advisor is based in Benin.
The Advisor developed a long-term law enforcement
training strategy and coordinated U.S. Government
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assistance to Guinea-Bissau law enforcement agencies.197 In November 2011, INL and the UN Integrated
Peace-Building Office in Guinea-Bissau collaborated
on Guinea-Bissau’s first “National Forum on Criminal
Justice.” The forum issued a report that recommended
a substantial restructuring of the nation’s criminal justice system and changes to the criminal code.198
Guinea as the Next Narco-State?
Some observers fear that the next state in West
Africa at risk of capture by drug traffickers is GuineaConakry, the eastern neighbor of Guinea-Bissau. Since
a coup in Guinea in December 2008, there have been
reports of Latin American cocaine traders moving in
significant numbers to Conakry, where some relatives
of the late President Lansana Ousmane Conte have
an established interest in the cocaine trade.199 In 2010,
the U.S. Government designated Ousmane Conte, the
son of Guinea’s late President, as a Tier I Kingpin.200
Although Alpha Condé became Guinea’s first democratically elected President in November 2010, his tenure has been weakened by delays in legislative elections and a lack of progress in security sector reform,
which has left a bloated military bureaucracy that is
more interested in its own prerogatives than in fighting against the drug trade. As with Guinea-Bissau,
the international community urgently needs to work
together with the Condé government to turn the tide
against state-capture in Guinea by drug traffickers.
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IMPACT ON SOCIETY
Historically, the societies of transit countries have
never been able to remain immune from the negative
impacts of drug trafficking. Inevitably, local consumption of drugs increases, which has cascading negative
effects on the social fabric, stability, and security of
any transit country.201 For example, no country in Latin
America has suffered as much as Brazil for becoming
a key transit country, where payment is often made
with drugs; it has become the second largest consumer of cocaine in the world, after the United States.202
Already, West Africa is proving that it is no exception.
There is often a lack of appreciation by leaders in West
Africa of how serious this problem is, and of how rapidly it can metastasize. An estimated $800 million was
spent on drug use in 2009 alone in West Africa, which
has become a huge local consumption market.203 Drug
consumption in West and Central Africa is growing quickly, with up to 2.5 million estimated drug
users now in these areas, a UN official reported in
February 2012.204
There are roughly 1.1 million cocaine consumers
in West Africa, according to UNODC, which indicates
that 8 percent of the world’s 14 million cocaine users
are from the subregion.205 Of the 35 tons of cocaine that
transited West Africa en route to Europe in 2010, 13
tons were consumed locally, and somewhat less than
one ton seized.206 Of particular concern is crack cocaine—increasingly popular due to the yield of 30-40
doses of crack cocaine from one gram of pure cocaine.
The numbers of crack cocaine users have increased
considerably over the past few years.207
UNODC estimated in 2009 that there were 793,000
heroin users in Central and West Africa, and 1.7 million for the continent as a whole.208
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Trafficking has also fueled increasing consumption of methamphetamine in the subregion.209 ATS are
transported mainly from Nigeria to several countries
in West Africa, with traffickers using land routes due
to the free movement policy of ECOWAS. The use of
amphetamines has already been reported in several
West African countries, including Burkina Faso, Niger, Senegal, and Sierra Leone—even among schoolaged children. UNODC has established an annual
prevalence rate of amphetamines at 1.4 percent in Nigeria based on a 2008 household survey. This rate is
higher than South Africa, currently thought of as the
most established ATS market in Africa, higher than in
most European countries, and comparable to use levels in Asia, where ATS use has a long tradition. 210
Ghana is one example of a West African nation with
a growing illicit drug problem. Cannabis is the most
abused illicit drug, but the use of hard drugs is on the
rise. Cocaine and heroin are the upper-middle-class
drugs of choice, while poorer Ghanaians get hooked
on crack cocaine.211 Evidence of an increase in cocaine
and heroin usage in Ghana is the sharp increase in
requests for drug recovery treatment in 2011. Up to
June 2011, there were 887 illicit drug users being treated at four psychiatric hospitals, with 7 percent being
treated for cocaine abuse, 4 percent for heroin abuse,
and the remainder for marijuana.212 It is safe to assume
that those seeking treatment at psychiatric hospitals
are but a small fraction of local users. Nigeria already
has a large number of heroin addicts, who number at
least in the tens of thousands.213 One U.S. Government
source had interviewed addicts in Liberia and Sierra
Leone who use cocaine, heroin, and crack cocaine, and
saw crack cocaine addicts in Guinea-Bissau—evidence
that these drugs are being consumed in West Africa in
even poorer countries than Ghana and Nigeria.214
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Throughout West Africa, the presence of drugs is
engendering a growing user population and straining
already weak health systems with no real mechanisms
to cope.215 Due to the lack of hard data on consumption, it is too early to tell how bad the long-term health
implications of drug trafficking through West Africa
will be. Despite this, experiences of other transit states
tell us they will be serious.216 For one example, governments in the subregion compromised by drug
trafficking have less to invest in health or education because those resources have been diverted to
address the insecurity resulting from traffickingrelated violence.217
Besides drug-related violence and the damage to
the health of West Africans, drugs and easy money
are also having a corrosive effect on societal norms
and values. In Ghana, there is a correlation between
increasing levels of addiction and rising crime.218
Drugs devalue traditional values, which had kept African societies cohesive and united. Unemployed and
desperate youths are vulnerable to being recruited
as foot soldiers for criminal groups.219 One ECOWAS report, referring to youth perceptions of drug
trafficking indicated:
Many young people believe that they can get rich
quick; they avoid school and end up as unskilled. . . .
The associated violence increasingly threatens people’s daily lives.220

Some West African drug traffickers even justify
their criminal activities as a way for the black market
to redistribute wealth.221 One observer noted that major drug traffickers act as heads of patronage networks
because of the prestige and influence that this buys,
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and because of an African expectation that wealth
should be shared with each individual’s network of
family and friends.222 Rich cocaine pushers who hold
extravagant parties to celebrate the acquisition of a
chieftancy title are a recognizable social type in West
Africa, one sociologist has asserted.223 To flaunt their
status, they build opulent, “narcotecture” homes.224 In
Nigeria, one academic has written, “some individuals have asserted that, since the drug trade involves
willing sellers and willing buyers at every stage of
the chain, it is essentially a legitimate form of commerce.”225 They use this to justify illegal economies,
including the drug trade, and share their profits with
local social groups to accumulate substantial political
capital and acquire legitimacy.226 Unfortunately, societal norms in Ghana look favorably upon successful
drug traffickers, as their increased wealth is seen as
“honorable,” one Ghanaian academic has asserted.227
In local languages, this academic has noted the increased use of proverbs that “glorify this wealth” and
make parallels to the honor of “going to war.” Some
drug dealers are buying royal titles, like “development chief,” to gain social status, and wearing Ghanaian traditional kente cloth with gold jewelry. There
is a “billionaire boys” club in Accra, some of whose
members drive Maseratis. This academic believed
that the best way to fight drug trafficking and its social acceptance is by the “naming and shaming” of
drug traffickers. 228
IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY
A few observers do not see the net economic impact of the drug trade on West Africa as all bad. Some
say that illicit drug trafficking in West Africa—by far
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the most lucrative transnational criminal activity229—
has become institutionalized and so entrenched that
it is essentially a part of each country’s economy,
making a huge, though unofficial, contribution to
national income.230
Indeed, trafficking in heroin, cocaine, and amphetamines has expanded dramatically across Africa as a
whole, growing into a roughly $6-7 billion annual illicit industry, according to conservative estimates.231
Estimates vary widely on the amount of drug money
flowing specifically into the subregion of West Africa.
In 2007, UNODC conservatively estimated that 40-50
tons of cocaine, with an estimated value of $1.8 billion, passed through West Africa.232 By contrast, it is
estimated that the amount of cocaine transiting West
Africa was at least five times the UNODC figure.233
At a May 2012 hearing, U.S. Senator Charles Grassley
estimated that cocaine flowing through West Africa
ranged between 60 and 250 metric tons, with annual profits estimated between $3 billion and $14 billion. These profits, the Senator noted, easily eclipsed
the value of the legitimate economies of most West
African countries.234
The only non-oil legal export from the region of
greater value than cocaine is cocoa, primarily from
Cote d’Ivoire. The value of cocaine transiting West
Africa surpasses even gold exports from Ghana and
bauxite exports from Guinea.235 Besides oil-rich Nigeria, criminal proceeds from drug trafficking in West
Africa probably average about 10 percent of typical
government revenues—which indicates how underresourced most West African governments are compared to TOC groups. The worst case is Guinea-Bissau,
whose status as the region’s leading cocaine hub means
that the value of its trafficking economy exceeds its tiny
formal economy.236
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Drug trafficking may be the most important variable that explains empirical data suggesting that:
cash remittances from Europe have increased dramatically in recent years in a number of West African countries. In Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal,
as examples, there has been a doubling or tripling
of remittances.237

While all these countries have large expatriate
populations, this sudden growth is difficult to explain without reference to the illicit drug trade. The
currency of one small West African nation, Gambia,
experienced a rapid appreciation of its value starting
at the end of July 2007. The dalasi appreciated 25.9 percent in value against the dollar in one single day on
September 27, 2007238—likely due to money laundering related to a new hub for the cocaine trade that was
reportedly set up in Gambia after (temporary) disruptions in Guinea-Bissau and Guinea.239 In June 2010,
concrete evidence of the link to Guinea-Bissau and
money flooding the economy came in the form of the
arrest in Gambia of five Venezuelans—one of whom
confessed to having moved from Guinea-Bissau—and
in the seizure of 2,196 kilos of cocaine with a street
value of $1 billion—about half of Gambia’s annual
gross national product in 2010. Gambian authorities,
with the help of UK anti-drug officials, also arrested a
Dutch national of Lebanese origin.240
Because the scale of the illicit drug trade in West
Africa is unknown, its exact contribution to each country’s gross domestic product (GDP) is unknown. Most
analysts, however, conclude that being a drug transit
state is, on net, very detrimental to a country’s development.241 Economically, the influx of drug and other
dirty monies into the local market can seem like a balm
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on poverty in the short term. There may be a building
boom, with construction providing needed jobs and
better quality accommodation. Over time, however,
much of this money begins to leave the country. Eventually, the tourism and business sectors start to suffer too.242 Investors are less inclined to do business in
drug transit countries because unstable environments
are risky and operating in higher-crime areas entails
higher business costs.243 Drug money investments also
risk exacerbating inflation and may contribute to high
real estate prices that disadvantage those engaged in
licit economic activities. TOC also hinders development in other ways by undermining the rule of law,
governance, the environment, and health.244
ONGOING PROGRAMS—
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
AND THE UNITED STATES
Given West Africa’s underdevelopment and the
global nature of drug trafficking, it is clear that the
governments of the subregion cannot respond to this
problem—and illicit trafficking in general—without
the help and cooperation of regional organizations
and the international community. West African nations, for the most part, welcome the aid and cooperation of the international community. Benin President Boni Yayi, for example, wrote in July 2011 to UN
Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon to request UNODC’s
assistance in helping his country formulate a national integrated program to fight drug trafficking and
organized crime.245 Togo President Faure Gnassingbe also reportedly sees the drug trade as a threat to
his authority.246
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Some observers have argued that basic government, law enforcement, and military institutions must
be in place before substantial investment in operational hardware will benefit West African nations.247 One
case in point is that of the national agencies in West
Africa charged with counternarcotics missions. Many
do not know how to gather and analyze counterdrug
intelligence, nor how to conduct investigations. Most
of the big seizures in West Africa have occurred by
chance or through a foreign tip-off. Many governments
also do not have the legal systems, judicial structures,
plans, funding, resources, and political will to combat drugs. Many countries lack the legal concepts of
conspiracy and plea bargaining. Both are powerful
legal tools in combating organized crime.248 Until recently, authorities have not systematically used asset
seizures from traffickers and money launderers as
enforcement tools.249
Ongoing programs by the UN, EU, and the United
States to aid West Africa’s anti-narcotics efforts
include the following.
UN/EU Assistance.
International aid to West Africa’s war on drugs is
only in an initial stage. In 2008, ECOWAS, supported
by UNODC and the UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA), in partnership with the EU, held a Ministerial Conference in Cape Verde to analyze the security
threat posed by drug trafficking in the region. The action plan that resulted from this conference was subsequently endorsed by ECOWAS Heads of State and
contained five thematic areas:
1. Mobilization of ECOWAS political leadership;
2.  
Effective law enforcement and national/
regional cooperation;
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3. Appropriate and adequate legal frameworks;
4. Emerging threats of drug abuse and associated
health and security problems; and,
5. Reliable data to assess the magnitude of the drug
trafficking and abuse problems.250
The West Africa Coast Initiative (WACI), officially
launched in December 2009, was the UN’s response
to the priorities in the ECOWAS Regional Action Plan
and is part of the UN’s Regional Program for West Africa for 2010-14. WACI and the Regional Program are
designed to support the efforts of West African States,
regional organizations, and the civil society to respond
to evolving security threats and to promote the rule of
law and good governance. Within the UN family of
agencies, WACI is a joint program of UNODC, UNOWA, the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), and
the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO),
joined by INTERPOL, which is not part of the UN.
WACI’s overall strategy, which is initially being
implemented in select West African countries, is to
strengthen the capacity of law enforcement officials
at both the national and subregional levels to combat
drug trafficking and organized crime. WACI targets
institutional capacity, building in law enforcement,
forensics, border management, money laundering,
criminal justice institutions, peace-building initiatives,
and security sector reform. It provides equipment,
technical assistance, and specialized training. WACI’s
initial phase of assistance involved an assessment of
the capacities and needs of four pilot countries where
there was already a major UN presence: Côte d’Ivoire,
Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. This initial
phase was concluded in February 2010 by a Ministerial Conference in Sierra Leone, where Ministers of the
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Interior of the four pilot countries adopted the Freetown Commitment and pledged to support WACI
implementation. A cornerstone of WACI is the establishment of elite TCUs in each country. These act as
national focal points for international cooperation,
and bring together police, customs, and immigration officers, prosecutors, and INTERPOL National
Central Bureaus, and also have access to INTERPOL’s I-24/7 communications network and global
police databases.251
Several other UN programs, such as the 2010 Airport Communication Project (AIRCOP) sponsored by
the EU and Canada, have been developed to attack
drug trafficking. One AIRCOP operation, Cocair 3, resulted in nearly 50 arrests, the seizure of more than 500
kgs of drugs, and the recovery of 2.5 million euros in
cash at 25 airports across Western and Central Africa
and Brazil.252 During its presidency of the G8, France
sponsored a meeting in March 2011 of G8 members,
with representatives from West Africa, Morocco, Algeria, South Africa, and several Latin American and
European nations to discuss the growing problem of
drug trafficking through Africa and a possible financing mechanism through the World Bank.253
U.S. Assistance.
U.S. counternarcotics assistance to West Africa is
also still in an early stage, but complements ongoing
efforts by the UN, the EU, and other international actors. American counternarcotics assistance for West
Africa totaled about $50 million for 2010 and 2011, up
from just $7.5 million in 2009.254 The U.S. Government
is just starting its West Africa Cooperative Security Initiative (WACSI) program, which will partner with the
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international donor community to engage ECOWAS
and support its Regional Action Plan.255 In this context, the U.S. Department of State sponsored a February 2012 meeting on the margins of the G8 Roma-Lyon
Group in Washington to discuss engagement with
ECOWAS, share program plans for the year, and discuss review mechanisms for sustained donor coordination. Besides UNODC and the EU, other participant
countries were Canada, Colombia, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Spain, and the UK.
WACSI is a 5-year, whole of government program,
developed in accordance with U.S. President Obama’s
Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime, to
address drug trafficking and organized crime in West
Africa.256 WACSI will help ECOWAS member-states
to harmonize their anti-drug and crime laws. In some
countries, such as Ghana and Nigeria, U.S. assistance
will focus on building capacity to detect, disrupt, and
dismantle drug trafficking networks. A U.S. judicial
adviser is being sent to Ghana, for example, to provide
training and advice on the prosecution of complex
drug cases. In other countries, especially post-conflict
countries like Liberia and Sierra Leone, WACSI aims
to enhance basic law enforcement.257 Starting later in
2012, an experienced U.S. prosecutor will serve as a
legal advisor in Sierra Leone to assist that country
in its efforts to combat public corruption more effectively, including by supporting investigations
and prosecutions.258
Some observers have described WACSI as an initiative that will try to replicate the steps taken in battling trafficking groups operating in Central America
and Mexico. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement William
Brownfield said the vision for both Central America
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and West Africa was to improve the ability of nations
to deal with drug trafficking, by building up their own
institutions and getting them to cooperate with one
another, sharing intelligence, and running regional
law enforcement training centers.259
U.S. Government agencies have taken several other
steps to address illicit drug trafficking in West Africa,
some of which can be considered part of WACSI:
•	DEA: In West Africa, the DEA currently has offices in Nigeria and Ghana, and plans to open a
future office in Senegal.260 During FY 2011, the
DEA organized eight seminars in Africa for 244
African law enforcement personnel, including
working through the Department of State’s International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA)
in Botswana.261 The DEA, partnering with Ghanaian authorities, aided the establishment in
August 2010 of the Ghana Vetted Unit—the
first vetted SIU in Africa. Due to its success,
the Ghana Vetted Unit was accepted into the
DEA’s global SIU program in August 2011. In
2012, the DEA worked with Nigerian authorities to establish a vetted unit in Lagos.262 The
DEA has requested funding from Congress for
additional offices and SIUs in other African
countries, including in West Africa.263
•	State Department: In countries where there is
not yet a strong understanding of the domestic
implications of being a transit state, the State
Department hopes to use public diplomacy to
build awareness264 among the population, and
particularly youth, regarding addiction and the
long-term health effects of drug use.265
•	
DoD: The DoD Counternarcotics Strategy,
which guides counternarcotics operations
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and assistance at all Combatant Commands,
including AFRICOM, calls for building hostnation capacity to conduct counternarcotics
operations through “enhancement of interdiction forces.”266 Training topics include airport
interdiction, clandestine methamphetamine lab
training, money laundering, and investigatory
skills.267
•	
AFRICOM: AFRICOM’s Counter Narcotics
and Law Enforcement Division provides about
$20 million in annual assistance to African
partner nations to help build their capacity to
combat transnational narcotics trafficking.268
Country project officers and intelligence analysts from AFRICOM are actively collaborating with their counterparts at Joint Interagency
Task Force South (JIATF-S), based at the U.S.
Southern Command in Miami, Florida, the U.S.
Office of Naval Intelligence, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the EU’s Maritime Analysis
Operations Center (MAOC) based in Lisbon,
Portugal, and others to monitor the drug flow,
support the broader efforts, build capacity, and
help guide which projects will have the greatest
impact against drug trafficking organizations.
AFRICOM also provides assistance to African
military and law enforcement units with counternarcotics missions, and has the following
projects already underway in West Africa:
— 
Students from multiple West African nations attend courses taught by U.S. Coast
Guard Trainers;269
— Construction of, and support for, the Cape
Verde Counternarcotics and Maritime
Security Interagency Operations Center
(COSMAR), an interagency fusion center in
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Praia that develops a regional intelligence
picture and communicates with JIATF-S in
Miami and MAOC in Lisbon.270 The facility
helped interdict about 1.5 metric tons of cocaine valued at over $100 million in October
2011;271
— Construction of a pier and refueling facility
to extend the range of the Senegalese Navy
to carry out interdiction patrols;
— 
Construction of a ship maintenance and
docking facility in Ghana to assist with maritime drug interdiction. Also, the building
for the Navy of a maritime territorial waters
monitoring center.272
•	USAID: The Agency for International Development (USAID) implements democracy and
governance programs in West Africa that address some of the key governance considerations related to TOC, including justice sector strengthening and anticorruption efforts.
USAID has also commissioned analytic research to better understand the relationship
between development and drug trafficking.
IMPACT OF WEST AFRICAN DRUG
TRAFFICKING ON U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS
Beyond counterterrorism, U.S. national security
goals for Africa outlined in National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 50 include building capacity,
consolidating democratic transition, and bolstering
fragile states.273 The growing problem of transnational
drug trafficking in West Africa directly jeopardizes related U.S. foreign and economic policy goals in Africa,
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such as the promotion of legitimate economic growth,
state institution-building, and diverse other foreign
aid program goals.274 West Africa is also of increased
importance to U.S. national security interest as a growing market and source of energy imports.275
One priority for the United States and the international community should be to disrupt the most
dangerous networks, i.e., those with the greatest links
or potential links to international terrorist groups.276
Consistent with the priority of disrupting the most
dangerous networks, Senator Dianne Feinstein, during a Senate hearing that she chaired in May 2012, gave
the following as her two top reasons why fighting the
narcotics trade in West Africa is in the U.S. national
security interest:
First, the same Latin American drug trafficking organizations that smuggle cocaine and other illegal drugs
into the United States are operating in West Africa,
particularly the Colombian FARC. As we support
the Colombian government in combating the FARC,
it is certainly not in our interest to see them enriched
through illicit activities in West Africa. The same is
true of Mexican drug trafficking organizations. In
2011, a Lebanese drug kingpin linked to Hezbollah
was indicted in U.S. federal court for coordinating the
sale of cocaine to Los Zetas by using West Africa to
launder huge amounts of drug money, likely up to
$200 million a month.
Second, drug trafficking in West Africa provides financing to dangerous terrorist organizations, such
as Al Qaida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb, or
AQIM. As just one example, in 2010, Mauritanian authorities reported that members of AQIM were providing security for a convoy of cocaine and marijuana.
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We must do everything we can to ensure that AQIM
and other extremist groups are not further strengthened by the drug trade.277

CONCLUSION: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
This Paper started with a quote from former UN
Secretary General Koffi Annan, who urged the international community “to take action now before the
grip of the criminal networks linked to the trafficking
of illicit drugs tightened into a stranglehold on West
African political and economic development.” It then
sketched out the context and history of drug trafficking in the region; analyzed the ways DTOs are structured and evolving patterns in trafficking; exposed
the negative impact of drugs on West Africa’s good
governance, society, and economy; reviewed international and U.S. counternarcotics efforts; and explained
impacts on U.S. national interests.
In this concluding section, the author will outline,
with minimal commentary, several recommendations
for U.S. policymakers. None of the recommendations
will be easy to implement. All will require budgetary and manpower resources in an era when both
will be increasingly scarce. Until recently, the United
States, preoccupied by September 11, 2001, and wars
in Afghanistan and Iraq, dedicated too few resources
to monitoring, much less combating, TOCs in West
Africa. Nevertheless, West Africa merits U.S. support, both for the well-being of its citizens, and for
those in the United States who will suffer indirectly
if the United States does not act now to stop transnational criminal networks operating in the subregion
and elsewhere.
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Recommendations.
1. Expand the U.S. Government’s Physical Presence in the Subregion. The expanded presence of U.S.
Government officials in West Africa could allow more
efficient and effective collaboration with host-government officials and civil society there by taking the following actions:
a. Reopen the U.S. Embassy in Guinea-Bissau,
and exercise expeditionary diplomacy to
facilitate in-country, whole of government
cooperation with local authorities and civil
society against drug trafficking. Current
legislative proscriptions notwithstanding,
seek funding/authorization to re-establish a
physical presence by official Americans, including by the DEA, if possible, in order to
engage the host government and civil society, support police and judicial authorities,
and help decriminalize/professionalize the
Guinea-Bissau armed forces. At present, the
U.S. Embassy is considered “closed,” and
there is only a limited physical presence of
a small number of non-American employees
(mainly or entirely Guinea-Bissau nationals,
who are considered to be “locally employed
staff”). While the U.S. Government, in part
due to U.S. law, has taken a sanctions-based
approach to Guinea-Bissau so far, it would
do well to reconsider parts of its approach.
By placing U.S. personnel in Bissau, such as
political officers, public diplomacy officers,
USAID development officers, Department of
Justice legal advisers, or even DEA staffers,
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the U.S. Government would have a much
better chance of implementing useful programs that could influence Guinea-Bissau’s
government and civil society. If there are legal impediments to such an action, a change
in the law should be considered. While the
physical presence of U.S. personnel in Bissau
would present risks to their physical safety,
these risks are manageable and likely far less
than those in other beachheads of U.S. “expeditionary diplomacy,” such as in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan.
b. Open a new DEA Office in Dakar (Congress
has already been notified, and the office is
expected to open in 2013) and consider new
offices, e.g., in Bissau or Conakry, Guinea
(location to be determined in part by an assessment of the political will in each country
to take action to fight against drug trafficking) or increased staffing for regional offices
in Accra and Dakar.
2. Seek Adequate, Multiyear Funding for AntiNarcotics Efforts in West Africa. Success in the antidrug effort will not be achieved overnight, but rather
will take years of sustained commitment by host governments and the international community. The Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control held
hearings in May 2012 on drug trafficking in West Africa and could be the best advocate in Congress for
expanded, multiyear funding to fight the drug trade
in West Africa. Congress could concurrently seek expanded legislative authority to allow more flexibility
in planning multiyear, anti-drug programs. Funding
could specifically be increased for the following:
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a. WACSI: WACSI is a U.S. Government interagency response to the ECOWAS Regional
Action Plan, but needs greater certainty of
continued future funding. (See Table 1 for FY
11-13 INL funding.)
FY 2011
FY 2012
					

Country/Region
Africa Regional (TSCTP)*
Africa Regional (West)
Ghana
Guinea
Liberia
Nigeria
Subtotal, Africa

Actual
2,500
2,433
500
500
16,000
1,250
61,368

Estimate
3,500
16,800
17,000
85,900

FY 2013
Request
2,500
13,000
15,662
74,947

*Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership.
Source: Money Laundering and Financial Crimes–Country Database, May 2012, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau, p. 34.

Table 1. Department of State (International)
Budget ($000) FY 2011–2013 INCLE: Overseas
Contingency Operations Budget Allocations ($000).
b. USAID Democracy, Governance, Peace, and
Security Program: More resources including
both funding and dedicated personnel are
needed to expand rule of law, anticorruption
focused on grand corruption, security sector
reform, and counternarcotics efforts to counteract the destabilizing effect of increased
narcotics trafficking in West Africa. Such efforts should target justice and police sectors
and strengthen related civil-society capacity.
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These efforts could be coordinated through
USAID’s West African Regional Mission if
the peace and security staff is expanded beyond the current personal service contractor
focused on TSCTP.
c. U.S. Coast Guard (USCG): to allow: 1) expanded training of West African navies and
coast guards, while increasing the number
and length of port stops for vessels participating in APS; and, 2) possible periodic patrol/interdiction operations in conjunction
with European and African counterparts.
d. DoD: to continue its funding for the Liberian
Coast Guard under Operation ONWARD
LIBERTY, a program managed by the USCG.
e. DEA: to fund the expansion of SIUs in Nigeria in the short term; other SIUs such as
in Senegal, Benin, Togo and Cote d’Ivoire in
the medium term; and Guinea and GuineaBissau in the longer term.
f. 
AFRICOM: to expand counternarcotics/
illicit trafficking training and equipping
efforts under its West Africa Regional
Engagement Plan.
3. Seek Closer Partnerships with Domestic, International Agencies on West Africa. Countries in West
Africa are among the poorest and least developed
in the world and have neither the resources nor the
capacity to fight powerful drug traffickers alone. By
working regionally, e.g., through ECOWAS, and with
international partners, they can eliminate duplication of effort and leverage their collaborative actions.
Stronger legal cooperation among West African nations, for example, would enable more effective extra-
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dition, mutual legal assistance, and confiscation of the
proceeds of crime. Stronger legal cooperation will be
meaningless, however, without the political will and
capacity to implement legal actions:
The region’s leaders must recognize the stakes and
their failure to act is a sign of helplessness or complicity. The international community should reward honest regional leaders with additional counter-narcotics
and development assistance, and withdraw from
those organizations which are corrupt.278

Working contacts must also be strengthened between countries of origin and destination, in South
America, Europe, and Asia. For its part, the U.S. Government internally should adopt a strong interagency
task force or program to address drug trafficking and
externally should seek international partners in Europe, Asia, and Latin America who could work with it
and ECOWAS member-states and Mauritania on joint
counternarcotics efforts. Specifically, the U.S. Government could:
a. Formalize short- and long-term joint planning, intelligence, and operational efforts
between U.S. Coast Guard, the Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S) in Miami; AFRICOM headquarters in Stuttgart,
Germany, including its Interagency representatives and Counternarcotics Office; and
U.S. Naval Forces Africa (NAVAF), based in
Naples, Italy.
b. Expand cooperation with European partners.
This would include:
— Increasing real-time information and intelligence-sharing with the EU’s Maritime
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Analysis Operations Center (MAOC) in
Lisbon;
— Continuing the G8 Roma-Lyon Group
dialogue, including exploring whether
the World Bank and the African Development Bank could fund programs targeting judicial reform;
— Work with the Fontanot Group, a Frenchled informal group of EU members that
meet on a semi-annual basis to discuss
counternarcotics projects in West Africa.
The group has developed a database to
share information on ongoing projects
to maximize international cooperation
and minimize duplication of effort. AFRICOM and State Department officials
attended the last Fontanot meeting and
deepened their coordination;
— Work with Brussels (and Ottawa) to see
if other cooperative projects are possible, e.g., building on the success of the
EU/Canada Airport Communication
Project (AIRCOP).
c. Seek other international partners, such as:
— Japan and Korea to jointly address the
increasing problem of methamphetamine
production in West Africa for sale in Asia
and the United States;
— China to support the maritime capacity of West African navies to carry out
coast guard function, including loans and
grants of patrol boats;
— Brazil, operationally via JIATF-S, the U.S.
Coast Guard, AFRICOM, and NAVAF,
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and strategically, through consultations
with the U.S. Government led by the State
Department’s Western Hemisphere, Africa, and INL bureaus. Brazil is already cooperating with African countries, particular with Cape Verde. The United States
should seek to collaborate with Brazil and
with African lusophone countries, which
could pay off in joint work in Guinea-Bissau, for example.
d. Deepen Cooperation with UN Agencies
and INTERPOL:
— Continue the excellent collaboration with
UNODC and INTERPOL—avoiding duplication of effort, and encouraging expansion of effort in West Africa;
— Expand cooperation with the UN’s International Maritime Organization (IMO),
including its efforts to work with the
Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa (MOWCA) and ECOWAS
Transport Ministries. Attempt to align
IMO/MOWCA efforts to promote coast
guard law enforcement functions and
engagements with African military and
judiciary/police authorities, which have
tended to reject IMO/MOWCA.
4. Aid West Africa to Expand Maritime Domain
Awareness and Cooperation. Because of limited resources and a strong, historical priority given to landbased forces, there is only limited maritime domain
awareness among littoral states in West Africa. Most
countries suffer from severe “sea blindness” about
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ongoing illicit activities in their respective territorial
waters and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). To help
correct this situation, the U.S. Government, and AFRICOM in particular, should:
a. Support ongoing ECOWAS efforts to
develop:
— A maritime cooperation and operational
agreement for the Gulf of Guinea with the
Economic Community of Central African
States (ECCAS);
— A regional maritime strategy and operational capacity in three zones, (E, F, and
G) through ongoing technical assistance.
b. Continue to invest in NAVAF’s annual African Partnership Station (APS) program and the
Obangame and Sahara Express exercises, which are
carried out with African and European partners.
Other contributing programs could include the Africa
Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership (AMLEP)
program, which is helping to build the maritime law
enforcement capacity of West African Navies and
Coast Guards.
c. Replicate in Lagos, Accra, Dakar, and other
West African capitals, as appropriate, the Cape Verde
model of the Counternarcotics and Maritime Security
Interagency Operations Center (COSMAR) in order to
link these countries to JIATF-S in Miami and MAOC
in Lisbon.
5. Promote International and Regional Agreements, and Changes in Domestic Law. While the U.S.
Government has a Presidential Determination allowing it to work directly with ECOWAS, and AFRICOM
has already concluded a Memorandum of Under-
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standing (MOU) with ECOWAS that encourages further cooperation, it would be beneficial to both the
U.S. Government and ECOWAS if they were able to
conclude a regional counterdrug agreement that also
facilitated bilateral cooperation with the Community’s individual member-states. Specifically, the United
States could seek the following:
a. Worldwide, there are 44 maritime counterdrug bilateral agreements or operational procedures
in place with the United States. The United States
and Europe could explore whether ECOWAS (and
ECCAS) would be willing, in the medium term, to
sign an accord similar to the Caribbean Regional
Maritime Agreement, thereby facilitating U.S. and
European interdiction in the territorial waters of West
(and Central) Africa, in coordination with African
partners; and,
b. Generally speaking, the international community could help West African nations to strengthen:
1) their legal frameworks and enforcement mechanisms against organized crime, money laundering,
and corruption; and, 2) their law enforcement agencies’ operational capabilities, including air, maritime,
and land border controls.279 More specifically, the international community could help countries in West
Africa by providing advice and when possible budgetary support to:
— Better train and pay judges, and construct
modern prisons;280
— Strengthen their anti-corruption commissions and offices of inspectors general
with expanded authority, resources, and
legal changes allowing greater autonomy;
— Reform election laws to become more
transparent and prevent drug profits
from buying elections;281
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— Modify domestic laws to incorporate
key provisions of international anti-drug
conventions;282
— Help African leaders become more conscious of the severity of the situation; and,
— Foster stronger public awareness of
the dangers of drug trafficking and
consumption.
One ongoing effort is the Dakar Initiative Against
Drugs, involving six countries in West Africa—Senegal, Gambia, Guinea, Cape Verde, Mali, and GuineaBissau—which in 2010 launched an effort to harmonize national drug control legislation consistent with
international law.283 Ministers of these six countries,
supported by regional and international partners
including ECOWAS, France, Spain, and the United
States, met in September 2012 in Dakar to consider a
draft harmonization law.284 These countries and partners should adopt this draft law and share their lessons learned with other ECOWAS member-states.
Table 2 analyzes further legal and administrative
actions West African governments need to take to
strengthen their abilities to fight money laundering
and financial crimes. The State Department, working with the U.S. Justice and Treasury Departments,
USAID, and U.S. Embassies in the subregion, could
assist West Africa to bring its domestic laws closer in
conformity with international standards.
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Criminalized Drug Money Laundering

Criminalized Money Laundering Beyond Drugs

Know Your Customer Provisions

Report Large Transactions

Report Suspicious Transactions

Maintain Records over Time

Disclosure Protection – « Safe Harbor »

Criminalized « Tipping Off »

Cross- Border Transportation of Currency

Financial Intelligence Unit

Intl Law Enforcement Cooperation

System for Identifying/Forfeiting Assets

Arrangements for Asset Sharing

Criminalized Financing of Terrorism

Report Suspected Terrorism Financing

Ability to Freeze Terrorist Assets w/o Delay

States Party to 1988 UN Drug Convention

States Party to Intl. Terror Finance Conv.

States Party to UNTOC

States Party to UNCAC

US or Intl Org Sanctions/Penalties

Actions by Governments
Benin

Y

Y

N

N

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

N

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

Burkina Faso

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

Y

N

N

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

Cape Verde

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

N

N

N

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

Cote d’Ivoire

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

N

N

Gambia

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

N

N

Ghana

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

Y

N

Y

Y

N

Y

N

Guinea

Y

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

Y

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

Y

Y

Y

N

N

Guinea-Bissau

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

N

N

N

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

Y

Y

N

N

Y

Liberia

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

Mali

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

Y

Y

N

N

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

Mauritania

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Niger

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

Y

N

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

N

Y

Y

N

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

Nigeria

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

Y

N

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

Senegal

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

Sierra Leone

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

N

N

N

Y

Y

N

Y

N

Togo

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

“Y” is meant to indicate that appropriate legislation has been enacted to address the captioned items. It does not indicate full compliance with international standards.
Source: Money Laundering and Financial Crimes–Country Database, May 2012, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL).
Note: This table includes all 15 members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Mauritania, which
left ECOWAS in 1999.

Table 2. Money Laundering And Financial Crimes
In West Africa-2012.
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